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1. Introduction  
 
There is much going on in Santibanez’s very interesting and densely packed paper. In the short 
time that I have, I cannot comment on all of it. I simply want to focus on one important claim 
that he makes, viz., that deception in the form of lying involving manipulation of others to 
achieve self-interested ends can do damage to the recipient of the lie. On the assumption that at 
least in some cases, this damage can be ongoing and very serious (as in the case of lying in 
political contexts), it would seem to follow that manipulative lying is morally objectionable in 
those cases. However, Santibanez does not take the further step of saying this explicitly. At the 
same time, the language used by the author throughout the paper suggests that he may assent to 
the claim that such lies are morally wrong: for example, even when discussing more benign 
forms of deception such as deceiving oneself into believing that they are a very good professor or 
a soccer player’s deceiving their opponents about their intent, there is reference to ‘damage’ and 
to the ‘victim’ of the deception. The concepts of damage and victimization tend to be seen in a 
negative moral light. 
 While using the language of ‘victimization’ and ‘damage’ Santibanez also grants that 
there are cases where self-deception and deceiving others are advantageous, and that animals 
deceiving predators, for example, leads to reproductive fitness, so that deception can be 
evolutionarily adaptive. Moreover, he seems to find the modular model of the mind 
countenanced by Kurzban (2012) to have some prima facie plausibility. However, he also 
appears to reject what the model entails, viz., that there is no real ‘you,’ so that all that I am or 
you are is a set of modules with distinct beliefs, where beliefs from one module can contradict 
beliefs from another module. A further implication of the model that Santibanez appears to reject 
but that Kurzban (2012) accepts is that agents use whatever module is most advantageous in the 
context and that this is simply the way we are set up by nature via the mechanism of evolution. It 
is worth mentioning that the idea of the modular mind is not a new one: it has been around for 
awhile. For example, Fodor (1983) advances the modularity thesis as does Stalnaker (1984) in an 
attempt to resolve the problem of deduction for doxastic logics. Stalnaker talks about distinct 
‘acceptance states’ where a proposition in one acceptance state may contradict a proposition in 
another acceptance state. And of course, there is the tripartite model of the psyche advanced by 
Freud (1977) where one may believe one thing consciously (X is good) and believe the opposite 
subconsciously (X is bad), known as ‘splitting’ (Rubens 1996). Moreover, the tripartite theory of 
the psyche adopted by Freud has its origins in Plato’s Republic. 
 In the remainder of this commentary, I shall argue that the modular model of the mind 
rings true, and that if it is true, then there is no overriding agent except perhaps in a narrative 
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sense. If there is no overriding agent, then there is no-one of whom it can be said that deception 
is wrong in any sense, including a moral one. Moreover, exactly who is doing the deceiving if 
there is no unified agent? And who is being deceived? This is not to suggest that deception is 
always acceptable and that social control of deception is inappropriate, since utilitarian 
considerations do not rely on responsibility or personal identity. Further, I shall argue that even 
manipulative lying that causes ongoing damage to its victims is not always a bad thing 
depending on who the victim is. Perhaps Santibanez would not disagree with this claim, although 
I believe that it is worth discussing. 
  
2. Modularity, deception and responsibility 
 
There is no decisive argument for or against the modularity of the mind hypothesis, although 
there is some empirical evidence out there to suggest that it is true. Mind you, there has been 
great resistance to the modularity hypothesis over the millennia since Plato proposed it in the 
Republic 2,300 years ago. For example, while Hume proposed a skeptical limiting case of 
modularity, Kant replied with the concept of the transcendental unity of apperception. Although 
skeptical about a unified ego in his early writings, Husserl later took the position that experience 
presupposes an ego, which bears affinities to Kant’s notion of the unity of apperception (Miller 
1986). One piece of evidence to suggest the truth of modularity is a recent study conducted by 
Athanasopoulos et al. (2015) where they found that people who are fluent in both German and 
English conceptualize the motion of objects differently in German than they do in English. Thus, 
the authors claim that such persons are of “two minds” (Athanasopoulos et al. 2015, p. 518). 
Along similar lines, Peretz and Cotheart (2003) provide evidence from neuroimaging that 
modularity is involved in music processing rather than there being one central processing faculty. 
 More generally, Harter et al. (1997) cite evidence from developmental studies that 
purportedly show that “during adolescence there is a proliferation of selves that vary as a 
function of social context” (Harter et al. 1997, 837). Thus, an adolescent will behave in opposing 
and contradictory ways across various social circles so that a young person may behave a certain 
way with their parents, another way with teachers and yet another way with their peers (Harter et 
al. 1997). The authors go on to argue that as an individual matures, they come to accept this 
diversity of selves as something good (Harter et al. 1997). Anecdotally and parenthetically, I 
notice of myself that I behave differently with bar buddies, cigar  buddies, members of my 
bowling team, with students, with colleagues, with close friends, with relatives, etc. so that there 
is no obvious ‘I’ across all of these social situations that is completely invariant, except upon 
abstract reflective narration. The importance of variation in identity as a function of social 
context is also observed by Ellemers et al. (2002). As the person matures, they tend to form a 
coherent and quasi-consistent picture of these disparate selves through self-narrative (Harter et 
al. 1997), although this unification strategy is thwarted in the case of those with personality 
disorders such as bipolar personality (Jorgensen 2006). This story-telling later in life gives rise to 
the concept of the so-called narrative self as discussed by MacIntyre (1981), by McAdams 
(2001) as well as in hermeneutic circles. This narrative self is more of an abstraction, a non-
fictional coherent story as opposed to a real ‘self’ with any causal powers. 
 And so, there is some reason to believe that modularity is true. Then it follows that 
outside of the narrative self, there may well be no ‘I’ that deceives nor that is deceived. In such a 
case, how is deception even possible? How can I deceive myself if there is no ‘self’ that exists 
outside of a narrative context, and how can I deceive you if there is no ‘you’ to deceive? 
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Moreover, even if the concepts of deception and self-deception somehow apply, there is no ‘I’ 
that bears responsibility, moral or otherwise, for any damage done to the ‘victim’ of a lie, nor is 
it clear that there is any victim at all to whom the responsibility for the lie transfers. The modular 
model of the mind employed by Kurzban (2012) and the picture that deception is simply the 
application of the most advantageous model in that context becomes more compelling in light of 
the empirical evidence for modularity. 
  
3. Manipulative lying as an optimal strategy in dire situations 
 
As noted above, Santibanez cites manipulative lying as being a potentially undesirable type of 
lying given that the recipients can suffer ongoing harm. I do not disagree with this claim, putting 
aside the issue of modularity, although what I disagree with is Santibanez’s further claim that the 
aim of argumentation theory with respect to manipulative lying “would be to have the liar justify 
himself and, for this reason, make a fool of himself.” (Santibanez 2016, p. 23) There will be 
many cases, countless cases, when the manipulative liar can justify their actions without making 
a fool of themselves. The types of cases I have in mind are situations where manipulative lying 
saves the lives of hundreds, thousands, millions. These types of lies are the true ‘noble’ lies as 
opposed to the arguably bogus noble lie outlined in the Republic! For example, citizens of 
Amsterdam hid thousands of Jewish children during World War II, which of course involved 
deceit, lies and manipulation of the occupying Germans. The brave people who hid these 
children at great personal risk would not make fools of themselves if they were asked to justify 
their covert actions. This is clearly a case where honesty is not the best policy! Similar 
observations apply to the lies and deceit used by the resistance movements in Europe in the 
1940s to overcome the Nazi occupation. What about undercover officers breaking up the 1 
percenter motorcycle gangs involved in drug dealing and murder? These officers use deceit, lies 
and manipulation to infiltrate these gangs and yet, it would be hard to imagine them making 
fools of themselves in justifying their subterfuge, even though the people arrested are damaged. 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, I have argued that there is reason to believe that the modularity thesis, or some 
version of it, is true. This is based on empirical studies. Then the whole notion of self-deceit, 
deceit of others and lying has to be either dropped or re-worked to cohere with the modularity 
thesis. This is not to condone deceit and lying (if it makes sense to talk of these) as these actions 
can be seen as morally wrong from a purely utilitarian perspective. The unit of assessment in 
utilitarian ethics is the social aggregate and not unified individuals so that lying could be 
justifiably curtailed for the good of the aggregate. Finally, putting aside the modularity thesis, I 
agree with the author’s suggestion that lying involving manipulation for self-interested ends is 
often undesirable, although there are also many cases when lying is a good thing, as in the 
situation of saving lives. 
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